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This paper provides a historical and future perspective on how neuropsychology and 
neuroimaging can be used to develop cognitive models of human brain functions. Section 1 
focuses on the emergence of cognitive modelling from neuropsychology, why lesion location 
was considered to be unimportant and the challenges faced when mapping symptoms to 
impaired cognitive processes.  Section 2 describes how established cognitive models based 
on behavioural data alone cannot explain the complex patterns of distributed brain activity 
that are observed in functional neuroimaging studies. This has led to proposals for new 
cognitive processes, new cognitive strategies and new functional ontologies for cognition. 
Section 3 considers how the integration of data from lesion, behavioural and functional 
neuroimaging studies of large cohorts of brain damaged patients can be used to determine 
whether inter-patient variability in behaviour is due to differences in the premorbid function of 
each brain region, lesion site or cognitive strategy. This combination of neuroimaging and 
neuropsychology is providing a deeper understanding of how cognitive functions can be lost 
and re-learnt after brain damage – an understanding that will transform our ability to 







The motivation for this paper was to describe a journey of thoughts and theories 
about cognitive models of human brain function that were initiated by conducting 
neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies with Glyn Humphreys.  Previous discussions 
of how neuroimaging has contributed to cognitive models were the focus of a special issue 
of Cortex more than 10 years ago. The lead article (Coltheart, 2006a) argued in line with 
others previously (e.g. Marr and Poggio, 1977; Colby, 1978; Uttal, 2001; Harvey, 2004) that 
knowing about neural implementation of cognitive processing had not to date (2006) 
informed or changed our cognitive models.  The debate centred on whether there was any 
evidence that neuroimaging had provided new insights that adjudicated between two 
alternative cognitive models.  Although several examples were offered (Jack et al., 2006; 
Henson et al., 2006; Jonides et al., 2006; Seron and Fias, 2006; Vallar, 2006), Coltheart 
(2006b) and others (Page, 2006; Schutter et al., 2006) argued that none of them had 
contributed any more information than could have been gained from behavioural studies 
alone.  More recently, in a special issue of Perspectives in Psychological Science (Mather et 
al., 2013a), Coltheart (2013) further emphasized that the contribution of neuroimaging data 
to a cognitive theory should not be based on the consistency of neuroimaging data with 
predictions from cognitive theory. It should be based on falsifying the predictions of a 
particular theory.   
In the current paper, I take a different perspective and focus on how neuroimaging 
has changed the way we think about the functional computations (types of cognitive 
processing) that underlie behaviour. I start by introducing the rationale, fascination and 
limitations of neuropsychology. The bottom line is that we do not know how cognitive 
functions are implemented in the brain. We can only speculate and approximate on what the 
underlying computations are and how they are instantiated.  I then discuss what 
neuroimaging has told us about the general principals of neuronal implementation and how 
the nature of the neuronal implementation constrains the nature of the computations and 
algorithms that are being performed. Therefore, this paper is not about the functions of 
different brain regions (i.e. the functional anatomy).  It illustrates how learning about the 
anatomy can shed new light on what the computations underlying cognition might be.   
The discussion of neuroimaging findings also highlights the fact that we don’t know 
what is being coded and we do not yet have a formal terminology to assign functional labels 
to brain regions. For example, most cognitive models of reading and spelling refer to 
“orthographic processing”.  This simply means processing related to written text but it 
doesn’t specify the nature of the processing or the degree to which this processing is shared 
by non-orthographic visual stimuli.  I consider why current psychological nomenclature is 
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insufficient to describe the function of brain areas and how neuroimaging is motivating new 
terminology, new brain functions and new cognitive models. 
 
In the final section, I highlight the benefits of integrating data from neuroimaging and 
neuropsychology. In brief, I show how neuroimaging can be used to distinguish between 3 
different types of inter-patient variability: differences in (i) lesion site, (ii) the brain structures 
that compute a given function, and (iii) the cognitive strategy used for a given task even 
when the structure-function mapping is consistent at the individual process level. This helps 
to provide a deeper understanding of computational functions, processing pathways, co-
occurring impairments and how the same functional impairment (and lesion site) can lead to 
different symptoms.  
 
Section 1: Using Neuropsychology to inform cognitive models 
Neuropsychology involves the study of behaviour in patients with neurological 
disorders. By indicating how brain damage impacts on behaviour, neuropsychological 
studies can test and infer models of the computations that underlie specific cognitive 
functions (e.g. language, memory, perception) in the neurologically normal brain. The most 
famous examples of neurological studies date back to the 19th Century when Paul Broca 
reported that patients with left posterior inferior frontal damage had more difficulty with 
speech production than speech comprehension; and conversely, Karl Wernicke noted that 
patients with damage to the left posterior superior temporal cortex had more difficulty with 
speech comprehension than production. This “double dissociation” in cognitive function 
(across different patients) indicated that speech production and comprehension are 
functionally independent of one another.   
 
Bringing Broca’s and Wernicke’s findings together, Ludwig Lichtheim developed a 
simple processing model of language that linked auditory representations of speech (in 
Wernicke’s area) to motor representations of speech (in Broca’s area) via anatomical 
connections through the arcuate fasciculus. Jules Dejerine added to the model (1891) by 
including visual images of speech in the left angular gyrus/supramarginal gyrus where 
damage could result in a selective reading difficulty that dissociated from relatively preserved 
spoken language and writing abilities. Dejerine therefore coined the term “pure alexia” to 
describe a very specific deficit confined to the impaired processing of orthographic code 





Figure 1 illustrates the 19th Century neurological model of language and reading. 
Other 19th Century neurological investigations reported double dissociations in other 
cognitive functions leading to a deeper understanding of hand movement control and its 
breakdown in different types of apraxia (Liepmann, 1990) and object recognition and its 
break down in different types of agnosia (Lissauer, 1890). 
 
Figure 1 about here. 
 
After the early 19th Century attempts to localise mental functions to brain structures, 
most neuropsychologists in the 20th Century divorced themselves from the anatomy and 
focused on “functional architectures”, building box and arrow diagrams of the computational 
processes and representations that were needed to support complex cognitive functions.   
Information about the brain was considered misleading and largely irrelevant.  The main 
concern was that the mapping between lesion site and cognitive deficit was inconsistent 
across patients, either because of premorbid differences in the computational functions of 
specific brain regions or because of differences in the degree to which the brain was able to 
reorganise itself when recovering from a lost function.  Another reason to focus on 
computational rather than anatomical architectures was that, until the 1990s, neuroimaging 
of the lesion site (e.g. with CT scanning) was rarely precise enough to dissociate the brain 
regions that support different types of processing.  In the last 2 decades, magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) has allowed us to match lesion sites across patients more 
precisely and demonstrated the very consistent effects that some lesion sites have on 
behaviour (Leff et al., 2006). It has also shown that the same lesion site can have dissimilar 
effects in different patients. For example, Figure 2 shows magnetic resonance images of the 
brains of two patients who both incurred damage to the left angular gyrus. One patient has 
difficulty reading and writing; the other has a slightly larger lesion that did not cause a 
reading impairment.  Factors other than lesion site (e.g. premorbid reading experience, co-
morbidity or differences in functional anatomy) must therefore explain the differences in 
reading ability after damage to the angular gyrus. 
 
Figure 2 about here. 
 
Throughout the 20th Century, cognitive models based on neuropsychological findings 
became increasingly sophisticated. For example, Marshall and Newcombe (1973) generated 
a dual route model of reading to account for why some patients have more difficulty reading 
words with irregular spellings (e.g. YACHT) than novel words (e.g. SHUP) and others exhibit 
the opposite pattern (more difficulty with novel words than familiar words with irregular 
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spelling). Patients with more difficulty reading irregularly spelled words were hypothesized to 
have a damaged lexical reading route with relative sparing of a sublexical reading route; 
whereas patients with more difficulty reading novel words than irregularly spelled words were 
hypothesized to have a damaged sublexical route with relative sparing of the lexical route 
(see Figure 3).   
 
As computing hardware and software developed, the validity of neuropsychologically 
motivated information processing models could be tested by building computational models 
that formalise and implement the hypothesized processing steps. In the case of reading, this 
initially resulted in a more parsimonious model composed of three components (orthography, 
phonology and semantics) and two different routes between orthography and phonology: a 
direct route and an indirect route via semantics (e.g. Plaut et al. 1996), see Figure 3.  Other 
more complex computational models have also been developed (Coltheart et al., 2001). 
 
Figure 3 about here  
 
These and many other studies of memory, object recognition, language and hand 
movements resulted in a resurgence of neuropsychology in the 1980s, including the launch 
of a journal dedicated to publishing neuropsychological findings (Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 1984) and text books introducing neuropsychological methods to 
psychology students (Coltheart, Patterson and Marshall, 1980; Shallice, 1988; McCarthy and 
Warrington, 1990). I was one of these students and, in 1984, I volunteered as a research 
assistant to Glyn Humphreys and Jane Riddoch to help them screen large numbers of stroke 
patients in several London hospitals. Their goals were very clear. They were looking for 
patients with selective deficits in cognitive functions, conducting detailed case studies to 
determine which types of processing (computations) were impaired or preserved, gaining 
deeper insight into the complexity of cognition and generating information processing models 
of cognitive functions and dysfunctions. The importance of their work was also clear 
because, by re-thinking neuropsychological syndromes in information processing terms, they 
could offer more precise ways of assessing cognitive functions, more meaningful diagnoses 
and potentially clues to indicate how impaired processing could be re-learnt to facilitate the 
most optimal recovery. Their findings resulted in numerous seminal papers that spanned 
many types of cognitive functions including unilateral visual attention (Riddoch and 
Humphreys, 1983), routes to object constancy (Humphreys and Riddoch, 1984), routes to 
action (Riddoch, Humphreys, Price, 1989), routes to reading (Humphreys and Evett, 1985), 
different types of agnosia (Riddoch and Humphreys, 1987; Humphreys et al., 1992; 
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Humphreys and Price, 1994) and category specific semantic impairments (Humphreys and 
Riddoch, 1987). 
 
Inspired by Glyn and Jane, I was a cognitive neuropsychology enthusiast.  Three of 
the lessons I learnt greatly influenced our subsequent neuroimaging work. The first was the 
lack of “pure specificity”.  Although patients might be more impaired using one function than 
another, cognitive impairments after brain damage are rarely confined to one function. I 
learnt this from conducting a review of 100 years of literature on “pure alexia” from boxes of 
papers that Max Coltheart gave me when he moved from Birkbeck College London to 
Macquarie University in Sydney. What I read over and over again was that reading 
impairments in patients diagnosed with “pure alexia” were typically reported to co-occur with 
object naming and/or colour naming difficulties. Therefore the evidence for a reading specific 
module was not compelling when patients’ perceptual skills were thoroughly tested.  An 
alternative hypothesis I found appealing was that deficits that appeared to be selective for 
reading could be the consequence of a perceptual impairment in rapidly processing multiple 
features (particularly letters) in parallel (Kinsbourne and Warrington, 1962).   
 
The second lesson was that the same symptom could arise from a breakdown at one 
or more processing levels. Specifically, by conducting multiple case studies of patients who 
were letter by letter readers, we illustrated how the same symptom (letter-by-letter reading) 
could result from difficulty in visual attention or processing visual features in parallel (Price 
and Humphreys, 1992). Likewise, Caramazza et al., (1990) reported that semantic errors 
during naming and reading were not necessarily caused by impairments in the same type of 
processing. 
 
The third lesson was that, even with extensive assessments of all possible 
processing abilities, it is often difficult to describe which deficits are causing the symptoms. 
Co-occurring deficits can lead to complex sets of symptoms, and two patients with the same 
underlying deficit can adopt very different compensatory strategies resulting in very different 
patterns of behaviour. For example, we showed how reading words could be worse than 
letter naming when the patient had a mild anomia as well as difficulty switching attention 
across the letters (Price and Humphreys, 1994).  
In Section 3, I will discuss how these neuropsychological observations can be 
investigated with neuroimaging. 
 
Section 2: Using Neuroimaging to inform cognitive models 
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The opportunity to pursue neuropsychological models with neuroimaging in 
neurologically normal individuals was very exciting. This was expected to introduce an 
independent source of physiological validity to conclusions derived from patients with brain 
damage.  The basic rationale involves 6 different steps. In Step 1, we take an information 
processing model of a given cognitive task with a known stimulus and response (e.g. Figure 
3). In Step 2, we use functional neuroimaging to identify the brain areas that are activated 
during the task. In Step 3, we compare the brain responses to those observed during other 
tasks that differ in distinct ways (e.g. reading the word rabbit versus naming a picture of a 
rabbit). In Step 4, we infer the type of processing that a brain region supports by examining 
how the brain region responds over a range of different conditions, using factorial designs, 
interactions and conjunctions (Price, Moore, Friston, 1997). In Step 5, we compare the 
processing associated with each brain region in Step 4, with processing specified in the 
models used in Step 1; and finally in Step 6, we update the cognitive model to be consistent 
with all sources of data. 
 
How can neuroimaging help adjudicate between two different cognitive models? The 
example I will give returns to the nature of orthographic processing. Are the brain responses 
involved in orthographic processing specific to reading or does orthographic processing rely 
on visual processes (e.g. parallel feature recognition) that is common to orthographic and 
non-orthographic visual stimuli? To investigate this question, we can use neuroimaging to 
evaluate whether there are any brain responses that are specific to orthographic inputs (e.g. 
activated during reading aloud but not during object naming). Such regions could be defined 
as orthographic processing modules. The alternative result would be that all the brain areas 
that respond to orthographic stimuli also respond to non-orthographic stimuli. In this case, it 
is not accurate to describe the brain regions as orthographic processing modules but we can 
specify which areas are activated when orthographic stimuli are presented, and how the 
degree and timing of activation in these areas changes with the type of stimulus, task or 
person being tested. 
 
In the 25 years that I have been conducting neuroimaging experiments, including 
more than 50 experiments on the neural basis of reading, I have never observed a brain 
area where the response was consistent with what would be expected if it was indeed 
dedicated to orthographic processing. This is in line with the conclusions of 
neuropsychological studies that have shown how reading impairments, in the absence of 
aphasia, are typically accompanied by difficulties processing non-orthographic stimuli when 
perception and attention are thoroughly tested, and response times are measured as well as 
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accuracy (see Farah and Wallace, 1990; Behrmann et al., 1998; Starrfelt et al., 2009; 
Starrfelt and Behrmann., 2011; Roberts et al., 2013). 
The trouble with reaching convincing conclusions about cognitive functions from 
neuroimaging data is multi-faceted. Some of the problems encountered have led to 
suggestions that neuroimaging has not told us anything useful about cognitive models so far 
(Coltheart, 2006a,b, 2013). The counter arguments are that  neuroimaging provides richer 
data sets for contrasting cognitive models (Turner et al., 2013) and allows us to distinguish 
whether neural responses are selective to a specific function (or stimulus) or shared by 
multiple functions/stimuli (Mather et al., 2013b). While such debates are important for 
drawing attention to the type of inferences that can and cannot be made from neuroimaging 
data, there are multiple examples of how neuroimaging results have thrown into question the 
usefulness of cognitive models based on traditional neuropsychological data. The key point 
is that, if our traditional cognitive models are correct, we should be able to (i) map known 
cognitive functions/computations to brain responses; and (ii) use this knowledge to predict 
whether this type of processing was engaged in a new task on the basis of the activated 
brain areas (Rubin et al., 2017).  In one sentence: Knowing what a region does, should 
indicate how this process contributes to a range of different cognitive tasks. 
Below, I highlight five specific challenges involved in linking cognitive models to 
neuroimaging data. For consistency, the neural systems that support reading and object 
naming will be used as an example. I then highlight more generic principles learnt from 
neuroimaging that motivate a very thorough re-thinking of traditional cognitive models. 
 
Five of the challenges involved in linking cognitive models to neuroimaging data 
Defining regional specificity.  When a region (or neuronal population) is selective for one 
type of stimulus over another, we cannot immediately rule out the possibility that there might 
be other types of stimuli or tasks that can activate the same region. For example, if we found 
an area that was activated for semantic decisions on written words but not for semantic 
decisions on picture of objects, we might conclude that this area was an “orthographic 
processing module” (Glezer et al., 2009).  However, another experiment might reveal that 
the so called “orthographic processing module” responded more during object naming than 
reading aloud (Price et al., 2006). In this case, we cannot conclude that the region is 
dedicated to orthographic processing. Instead, we might hypothesise that the region played 
a role in linking familiar visual stimuli to their names, which occurs automatically during 
presentation of written words (irrespective of task), but only for pictures of objects when the 
task requires name retrieval (Glaser and Glaser, 1989). Pursuing strong evidence for 
“specificity” therefore requires many time consuming and expensive neuroimaging 




Specificity in functional connectivity: The absence of a brain region that is dedicated to 
orthographic processing does not exclude the possibility that there are other types of neural 
responses that distinguish orthographic from all other types of non-orthographic processing. 
For example, specificity for orthography might be observed in the combination of regions that 
are activated (even if each region is involved in many other functions), or it might be in the 
way that different regions communicate with one another (i.e. specificity in the functional 
connectivity). To test these hypotheses, we need to report (i) the relative degree of activation 
in distinct regions for different stimuli and tasks, (ii) how these regions connect to each other 
during different conditions, and (iii) the relative timing of activation in each region. Delivering 
the relevant data to test these hypotheses has been much more challenging than it might 
sound because it requires neural measurements and analyses that combine results from 
different techniques (with high spatial and temporal resolution) and across multiple different 
brain regions. This may take decades given the time, expertise and expense involved. 
  
The spatial scale of specificity. When different types of stimuli and task activate the same 
brain regions, it could be argued that the spatial resolution of the neuroimaging technique 
was not sufficient to distinguish processing specific neurons. We have considered this 
possibility by using neuroimaging data with very high spatial resolution (Wright et al., 2008; 
Figure 4). Although we cannot rule out the possibility that there are orthographic specific 
neurons within commonly activated brain regions, the spatial resolution of neuroimaging data 
is much higher than that of lesions. A null result in neuroimaging (common activation for 
different stimuli) should therefore also result in a null result in neuropsychological data 
(impairment in all tasks that rely on the damaged functions/computations). 
 
Figure 4 about here  
 
Specificity in neuropsychological data that is not observed in neuroimaging data. 
If neuroimaging shows that a cognitive function of interest activates brain regions that are 
also strongly activated by other functions, how can brain damage disproportionally affect one 
function relative to the other?  For example, neuroimaging studies have shown that a region 
in the left ventral occipital cortex – often referred to as the visual word form area – is more 
activated by object naming than by reading (Price et al., 2006). In contrast, 
neuropsychological studies have shown that damage to this region can cause more severe 
difficulty recognising written words than objects (Starrfelt et al., 2009).  This could occur if 
the undamaged (preserved) brain regions are able to support the recovery of object 
recognition but not that of reading.  For example, if the damage the patient has incurred 
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preserves brain structures that provide partial visual clues (global shape/distinguishing 
features), this processing might be sufficient for accurate recognition of objects with 
distinctive shapes but not sufficient for accurate recognition of words which have very similar 
visual structures and therefore require parallel processing of multiple visual features.  As 
noted above, however, a relative difference in accuracy between object and word recognition 
does not imply that object recognition is normal when response times are taken into account 
(Behrmann et al., 1998; Starrfelt et al., 2009; Starrfelt and Behrmann., 2011; Roberts et al., 
2013).  
 
Other complexities and inconsistencies:  Perhaps the greatest challenge in relating 
neuroimaging data to cognitive models is that specific cognitive functions (e.g. orthographic 
processing) are typically associated with activation in multiple brain regions. This is known 
as “distributed processing”.  At a superficial level, distributed processing is not necessarily 
challenging for cognitive models. It just adds complexity to the description of the functional 
anatomy. For example, we can describe the functional anatomy of semantic processing as a 
distributed set of brain regions that includes anterior and posterior inferior temporal cortex 
and the angular gyri (Binder et al., 2011).  However, when different experiments report 
different sets of regions for the same type of processing, we need theoretical accounts to 
explain why the brain activations are changing across studies: Does each region within a 
system support computational functions that are not yet specified in the cognitive model? Or 
does variation from one study to another reflect inter-subject variability in cognitive strategy 
or the brain regions that support a particular type of processing?   These questions need to 
be addressed by re-considering the computational mechanisms that are shared by different 
tasks (Patterson and Lambon Ralph, 1999; Price and Friston, 2005; Humphreys & Lambon 
Ralph, 2015) and conducting more experiments with large samples of participants so that 
inter-subject variability can be investigated. 
   
 
Implications of neuroimaging findings for interpreting neuropsychological data and re-
thinking cognitive models  
 Despite the challenges faced, neuroimaging has already transformed our 
understanding of cognitive models. This has happened indirectly by gradually illustrating that 
well-established cognitive models (i.e. those taught in psychology text books) are not 
sufficiently detailed to predict patterns of brain activation during tasks that are known to 
weight different types of processing. One might argue that it is not important for cognitive 
models to predict brain responses. However, as I will describe below, the validity of current 
cognitive models is directly challenged by observations that the mapping between known 
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cognitive functions/computations and brain structures does not indicate a one-to-one 
relationship.  Many regions can be associated with the same type of processing, and 
conversely, the same brain region can be assigned multiple different functions depending on 
the cognitive model that the investigator is using. Together, this results in a many-to-many 
mapping between cognitive function and brain structure which is highly relevant for 
understanding the basic computations of the human mind, how they break down after brain 
damage, and how the brain might compensate for the lost functions. Below, I provide four 
examples of how this many-to-many mapping is informing cognitive models. 
 
Introducing new cognitive functions. As described above, neuroanatomical descriptions 
that associate multiple brain regions with a single cognitive function become unmanageably 
complex in the context of observing that the set of regions that comprise the distributed 
neural system for one type of processing do not always activate together and may 
differentially contribute to other neural systems involved in other types of processing. In this 
case, a neuroanatomist might ask: What does each region do? How do we predict when a 
region will be activated or not? How do different computations combine to generate 
increasingly complex cognitive functions? If successful, the neuroanatomist will have created 
their own cognitive model with their own processing components. These biologically 
informed cognitive models can be compared to those based on behavioural data alone – 
and will have the added advantage that they predict brain responses from behaviour, and 
conversely should be able to predict behaviour from brain damage.  
 
A recent example of a type of processing that was not predicted from cognitive 
models comes from an investigation into the response properties of different parts of the 
supramarginal gyrus (Oberhuber et al., 2017), see Figure 5. In this study, we compared 
activation for 8 types of stimuli (familiar written words, familiar heard words, unfamiliar 
written pseudowords, unfamiliar heard pseudowords, pictures of objects, sounds of objects, 
meaningless colour patterns and meaningless humming in male and female voices), each 
presented during two different tasks (speech production and one back matching). Within the 
supramarginal gyrus, we found a ventral posterior part that responded when written or 
spoken speech was being processed (consistent with some form of phonological processing) 
and a more anterior ventral part that responded to the demands on articulatory planning 
(consistent with output from phonology). However, it was difficult to identify the type of 
processing that was supported by the other two regions. For example, a posterior part of the 
dorsal posterior supramarginal gyrus (blue in Figure 5) was more activated for reading and 
repeating words than all other conditions which collectively controlled for semantic 
processing, lexical phonological retrieval, the mapping of orthography to phonology and 
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speech output. Previous neuroimaging studies have shown that the same dorsal posterior 
supramarginal region has also been associated with the acquisition of vocabulary 
(Richardson et al., 2010) and is anatomically linked to semantic processing regions in the 
angular gyrus and speech processing regions in more anterior supramarginal gyrus areas 
(Lee et al., 2007). We therefore hypothesized that it was actively involved in integrating 
lexical and sublexical phonological inputs which is more important when reading or repeating 
words than any other condition (Oberhuber et al., 2017). Critically, this type of processing is 
not specified in any of the boxes or arrows of traditional cognitive models of reading (see 
Figure 3). 
Figure 5  
 
Re-defining old cognitive functions. As just described, we can sometimes forge new 
cognitive labels to explain the response properties of a region. One of the consequences of 
this is that different researchers will produce different labels for the same region, depending 
on their interests. For example, a region in the left ventral occipito-temporal cortex is referred 
to as a visual word form area” by those who are interested in reading (Dehaene and Cohen, 
2011), “the ventral object recognition system” by those who are interested in object 
recognition (Kravitz et al. 2013), and a region that integrates visuospatial features abstracted 
from sensory inputs with higher level phonological and semantic representations (Price and 
Devlin, 2011). Again, one might argue that it is irrelevant whether a computation of interest 
shares a biological substrate with a computation from another cognitive model. However, 
observations that there are common components for different cognitive tasks provides 
unique insights into how we could ultimately generate a single cognitive framework that 
includes generalised sensory and motor functions that support multiple cognitive tasks. 
Figure 6 provides an example of a physiologically constrained cognitive model of heard and 
seen speech and non-speech processing.  
 
FIGURE 6 about here 
 
Although generalised models are inevitably more complex than those focusing on 
individual functions (e.g. Figure 6 vs. Figure 3), simplicity is gained when different task 
models are integrated into an internally consistent, scalable framework. We have referred to 
this type of modelling as “functional ontologies for cognition” (Price and Friston, 2005). The 
goal is to provide a framework of all the computations that are shared or distinct for a range 
of different cognitive tasks (e.g., reading, repetition, object and colour naming), with each 
computation corresponding to the type of processing that is implemented in functionally 
distinct brain regions. Obviously, achieving such a framework will be challenging because it 
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requires a standardized definition for cognitive processes across diverse communities of 
scientists, harmonization of conflicting results from different techniques and an enormous 
number of new studies and data to test the validity of the model (Hastings et al., 2014). This 
should surely be our goal. 
 
Multiple routes for the same task. The third useful insight that “distributed processing” has 
offered cognitive models is that, when there is a wide network of multiple regions involved in 
the same task, these regions can inter-connect with one another in different ways.  This 
provides a rich set of alternative neural pathways for translating the same sensory input into 
the same response output.  We describe alternative neural pathways for the same task in 
terms of “degeneracy” (Price and Friston, 2002) which is defined (in Wikipedia) as “the ability 
of elements that are structurally different to perform the same function or yield the same 
output”. It is evident throughout biological and physical systems, for example, in genetic 
codes or body function.  For example, most people can write their names with a pen in their 
right hand or their left hand, even if they are better using one than the other (due to inherent 
preferences and practice). 
 
By testing the functional connectivity between different brain regions, neuroimaging 
has confirmed that there are indeed multiple ways that the same stimulus (e.g. a written 
word) can be converted into the same output (e.g. its spoken name).  In neuropsychological 
terms, these alternative neural pathways can be equated to different processing routes or 
cognitive strategies (Binder et al., 2005; Mechelli et al., 2005; Graves et al., 2014; Hoffman 
et al., 2015) but at present there is not a clear correspondence between the number of 
neural pathways that are being identified (see Figure 7) and the number of routes included in 
traditional models (Figure 3).   
 
Inter-subject variability. When there are multiple ways of doing the same thing, 
neurologically normal individuals differ in which cognitive strategy/neural pathway they prefer 
to use (Seghier et al., 2008; Kherif et al., 2009; Miller et al., 2012; Hoffman et al., 2015). 
Neuroimaging has provided rich evidence for inter-subject variability in the degree to which 
neurologically normal individuals use different pathways (Figure 7). The next step is to 
understand whether there are any behavioural or demographic markers that indicate which 
neural pathway an individual is likely to be using. This would allow us to link cognitive 
strategies to neural pathways and examine how these pathways/strategies are learnt or 
relearnt (see Section 3 for a more detailed discussion). 
 




Section 3: Combining neuropsychology with neuroimaging 
This section briefly summarises how neuroimaging can be used to inform 
neuropsychological studies and how the integration of results from both types of data 
provides the most clinically useful, physiologically plausible, models of cognition.   
 
Understanding co-occurring functional impairments: Using behavioural data alone, a 
neuropsychologist can identify which type of processing a patient has impaired or preserved, 
as well as the severity of each impairment.  The goal is to show that distinct computations 
can be independently impaired in different patients (see Section 1). It is also possible to (i) 
show how the same impairment can affect multiple disparate task domains (Patterson et al., 
2006), (ii) explore how individual differences in specific processing impairments affect 
performance on tasks of interest (Woollams et al. 2007) and (c) use principal component 
analyses (PCA) on larger scale behavioural data to identify, in a data driven manner, 
patterns of co-occurrence in neuropsychological data (Butler et al., 2014; Halai et al., 2016). 
Nevertheless, it can be challenging to interpret why two different functions (defined 
on the basis of the cognitive model being tested) are always observed to be impaired 
together (e.g. word and object recognition). In this case, behavioural data alone cannot 
distinguish between two alternative explanations:  (1) that co-occurring impairments are the 
consequence of the two functions being co-located (i.e. in close proximity in the brain) and 
are therefore commonly affected by brain damage; or (2) that both cognitive functions rely on 
another undefined lower level function that explains both co-occurring functional impairments 
but is not part of the cognitive model being tested.   
 
With functional neuroimaging studies of neurologically normal individuals, we can test 
if the two different types of processing are co-located in the brain. With structural 
neuroimaging of the patients, we can test whether the lesion site in the patient includes the 
areas that are normally activated by the lost computations; or whether there is damage to 
the white matter pathways that connect different cortical and subcortical regions. By 
integrating all the available data with a good prior knowledge of the function of different brain 
regions, we can make informed hypotheses about which types of processing are likely to be 
impaired. 
 
Same functional impairment results in different symptoms.  Despite the challenges (e.g. 
of co-occurring deficits), some patients have selective deficits that fit with meaningful 
functional impairments.  Take the case of “anomia” as an example. Patients with anomia 
have good object recognition, semantic memory and auditory repetition skills but struggle 
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when trying to retrieve the names of familiar objects.  Their impairment can therefore be 
described at the level of “word retrieval”. Nevertheless, patients with supposedly common 
functional impairments may vary in the severity and duration of their anomia, the type of 
errors they make and also in their ability to perform other functions. Using behavioural data 
alone, we do not know if this inter-patient variability is due to differences in: (i) the type of 
processing that is supported by specific brain regions, (ii) lesion site or (ii) the set of 
computations (and regions) used to complete a specific task (i.e. the cognitive strategy).  
With functional neuroimaging of neurologically normal individuals, we can investigate the 
degree of inter-subject variability in functional anatomy (how consistently does a region 
respond to a specific type of processing). With structural neuroimaging, we can stratify 
patients in neuropsychological studies on the basis of their lesion site.  
After stratifying patients on the basis of their lesion site, we can investigate how 
matching lesion sites can have inconsistent effects in different patients. This requires an 
understanding of inter-subject variability in cognitive strategy before and after brain damage.  
We can investigate the neural pathways (i.e. sets of brain regions and their functional 
connectivity) that an individual uses to perform a task using functional neuroimaging. By 
comparing the identified pathways across neurologically normal controls and patients with 
specific lesion sites, we can estimate how many pathways there might be and how 
frequently each pathway is adopted. This may provide vital clues as to how cognitive 
functions can be recovered after brain damage. For example, if we establish from 
neurologically normal individuals that a task is typically performed by one of two possible 
pathways, the effect of damage to only one of these pathways will depend on whether the 
patient pre-dominantly used the damaged or undamaged pathway prior to their stroke. Let’s 
refer to the pathway a patient uses most as their “dominant pathway” and the pathway they 
use less as their “non-dominant pathway”. If the non-dominant pathway is damaged, the 
ability to perform the task should not be severely affected because the patient can still use 
their dominant pathway. On the other hand, if the dominant pathway is damaged, then the 
patient needs to use another pathway (i.e. functionally re-organise) which might happen 
spontaneously or require practice and/or intervention.   
By conducting an iterative combination of lesion, behavioural and functional 
neuroimaging studies in large cohorts of patients with diverse and carefully matched lesion 
sites, we can document which neural pathways are used for a given task and the conditions 
that determine when a pathway will be adopted. This will involve searching for any markers 
(behavioural, demographic or neuroimaging) that are associated with a given pathway. In 
this way, neuroimaging and the concept of degeneracy provide a framework for investigating 
(i) how a cognitive system can survive damage; (ii) how functional reorganisation can be 
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supported, (iii) how the influence of behavioural and demographic factors (e.g. vision, sight, 
general health) depends on lesion site and (iv) how this information can be used to predict 
the speed of recovery that a new patient could make.  
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
In Section 1, I raised three types of observations that hamper the interpretation of 
neuropsychological data. The first is the lack of “pure specificity”.  Although patients might be 
more impaired using one type of processing than another, cognitive impairments after brain 
damage are rarely confined to one type of processing. The second and third lessons were 
that the same symptom can arise from many different types of impairments and, conversely, 
the same underlying impairment can result in very different symptoms. In Section 2, I 
discussed the challenges faced when trying to test cognitive models with neuroimaging. I 
then proposed that the neuroimaging perspective that provides the greatest insight into 
cognitive models involves a many-to-many mapping between brain structure and known 
cognitive functions/computations/types of processing. This has led to proposals for new 
computational processes, new cognitive strategies and new ontologies for cognition that 
predict structure from function and function from structure (Rubin et al., 2017). It also 
provides an organised framework for understanding how cognitive functions are learnt or 
relearnt after damage and how learning can be influenced by training.  
 
Finally, in Section 3, I considered how neuroimaging can inform neuropsychological 
studies by distinguishing between three different types of inter-patient variability: differences 
in premorbid functional anatomy, lesion site or cognitive strategy. By unveiling all possible 
neural pathways for a task, in normal and damaged brains, we can reconsider the underlying 
computational units and processing pathways. Moreover, by combining all sources of data, 
we can generate cognitive models that will be most informative for predicting, explaining and 






Figure 1: The Neurological model of Language.  
An illustration of the anatomical and functional processing pathways that were hypothesized 
on the basis of post mortem studies conducted in the late 19th Century.   
 
Figure 2: The “same” lesion site can have different effects in different patients. 
 MRI images from two different patients who both have damage to the left angular gryus. 
This caused reading and writing difficulties in Patient 1 but not in Patient 2. 
 
Figure 3: Mapping cognitive processes to brain activation.  
Left: Dual route model of reading that dissociates the processing of lexical and sublexical 
orthographic inputs.  Middle: A simpler model of reading that explains the same symptoms 
without having separate pathways for lexical and sublexical processing (Seidenberg and 
McClelland,1989; Plaut et al., 1996). Black text is used for inputs, processing type and 
outputs. White text, in grey boxes, indicates the type of stimulus that would be impaired 
when a specific pathway was damaged.  Right: Brain activations for reading segregated into 
visual/orthographic (red), semantic (yellow) and speech production (green) processing. The 
brain activations shown were identified by re-analysis of data from the experiment described 
in Seghier and Price (2012). 
 
Figure 4: Common activation in the left ventral occipito-temporal “reading area” for 
reading aloud and object naming. Top: a section from a T1 image of the whole brain 
highlighting the area (in white dashed box) that we focus on in our high resolution functional 
neuroimaging data below.  Middle: Red shows activation during reading aloud highlighting 
the left ventral occipito-temporal reading area in a white circle.  Bottom:  Yellow shows 
activation in exactly the same place for object naming. Data from Wright et al., (2008). 
 
Figure 5: Four different reading responses in the left supramarginal gyrus are not 
predicted by cognitive models. The blue region was more activated for reading and 
repeating words than naming objects (from pictures or sounds), reading/repeating 
pseudowords and colour/gender naming. Activation is therefore highest when phonology can 
be generated from both lexical and sublexical phonological information. This was not 
expected from the cognitive models shown in Figure 3. The yellow region was more 
activated by reading pseudowords and naming objects than reading words or any of the 
other conditions. This cannot be explained by any the cognitive processes in Figure 3 (see 
Oberhuber et al., 2017).  The green area was more activated for reading words and 
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pseudowords than naming objects or colours. This would be consistent with “the mapping of 
orthography to phonology”, except that the same region was more activated by all auditory 
stimuli than all visual stimuli, even when stimuli and tasks did not involve speech processing. 
The brown area was activated during speech production compared to one-back matching on 
the same stimuli. Activation was also higher for producing different object names on every 
trial compared to naming a limited number of colours repeatedly.  Its response was therefore 
consistent with overt speech articulation.  The white area within the black border shows 
other parts of the supramarginal gyrus as defined anatomically according to the IBASPM 
software in SPM 12. Data and explanations are from Oberhuber et al., (2017). 
 
Figure 6: A physiologically constrained model of word processing 
The model describes processing that is required for speech recognition but not 
specific to speech recognition. Incoming visual or auditory stimuli (e.g. a written or 
spoken word) are first processed in the primary sensory areas of the brain. By 
integrating these sensory features with prior knowledge, we form a visual or auditory 
mental image of the presented stimulus (that the subject may or may not be aware 
of). Auditory images of speech are equivalent to phonological (input) representations 
but the model uses generic terms to emphasize that the same brain regions are also 
involved in auditory images of non-speech sounds (Dick et al., 2007; Leech et al., 
2009; Price et al., 2005; Saygin et al., 2003). If the sensory inputs carry semantic cues 
(e.g. familiar words, pictures of familiar objects or sounds of familiar objects), 
semantic associations can be retrieved and linked to the articulatory patterns 
associated with the word or object name (word retrieval stage). If there are no 
semantic cues available, articulatory plans can only be retrieved from the non-
semantic parts of speech stimuli, e.g. the sublexical parts of an unfamiliar 
pseudoword (a pronounceable nonword). Finally, the articulatory plans are used to 
drive motor activity in the face, mouth and larynx when the task involves a speech 
response. This generates auditory and somatosensory processing (i.e. we hear and 
feel the movement in the speech articulators). This model was adapted from that in 








Figure 7: Neural pathways for reading outnumber predictions from cognitive models.   
(A) Brain regions and functional connections for reading that have been shown to dissociate 
for different types of word stimuli (Mechelli et al., 2005) and in different subjects reading the 
same words (Seghier et al., 2010; 2014; Richardson et al., 2011).  The dissociation of these 
pathways can be demonstrated by showing that as use of one pathway increases, use of the 
other pathway decreases.  (B) shows inter-subject variability in the engagement of the 
putamen reading pathway. Group 1 used the putamen (put) reading pathway more than 
other pathways. Group 2 did not use the putamen pathway more or less than other 
pathways.  Group 3 used the putamen pathway less than the other pathways. Data from 
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Figure 4: Common activation in the left ventral occipito-temporal “reading area” for 






Figure 5: Four different reading responses in the left supramarginal gyrus are not 



















Figure 7: Neural pathways for reading outnumber predictions from cognitive models.   
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